As the United States becomes further involved in the uprising in Libya and continues war operations within the countries of Afghanistan and Iraq, I take time to think about past wars and whether certain actions were necessary. Of course, one war in particular comes to mind, which is the Vietnam War.
Known as the “Architect of the Vietnam War,” and a primary character concerning the United States' actions during the war, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara often receives much scrutiny— and perhaps it is well-founded A notable and curious event known as the Gulf of Tonkin Incident is often used as evidence that McNamara helped to initiate a war that simply didn't need to exist.
The Gulf of Tonkin Is located in the South China Sea. To the northwest, west, and south it borders Vietnam, while to the northeast it borders China. The island of Hainan lies to the east. Although this event occurs in these choppy waters, it will extend all the way back to the United States of America.
Although simply called The Gulf of Tonkin incident, it is composed of two separate incidents, with both occurring during the first year of Lyndon B. Johnson's administration, in 1964. It mainly concerns the USS Maddox, which was in the Gulf of Tonkin performing DESOTO operations1. DESOTO operations were intended to collect intelligence which could be used to make raids more effective. The USS Maddox reported on August 2nd that it was under attack from three separate North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Although the Maddox maintained only minor damage, it later reported having retaliated with 127mm, or five-inch, guns and chased the boats away. As the boats retired, it attacked with four jets. The jets reported that at least one of the boats were sunk before the Maddox retreated to South Vietnamese waters2. It was here that she was joined with the USS Turner Joy.
The second, and more controversial, incident occurred two days later on the 4th of August. This incident concerned both the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy. The DESOTO patrol was going well until radar began to show what appeared to be more attacks. Both the warships retaliated heavily and for at least two hours fired3. It was a repeat of the incident two days prior, although two North Vietnamese ships were reported to have been sunk.
President Johnson appeared on television shortly after where he states that action must be taken. The next day, air assaults land on multiple torpedo boat bases. The United States' citizens agrees with the President's actions, and Congress does as well. Three days after the second incident, on the 7th of August, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution is passed in the House of Representatives unanimously and with only two nay votes in the Senate. This resolution granted Johnson an unprecidented ability to take whatever affirmative actions he deemed necessary, including full military use without the need of a declaration of war4. He would take full use of this, and the United States would find itself pulled deep into the Vietnam War. But that is only what the American public heard at the time, and this is where Robert McNamara receives much criticism.
Behind the scenes, the 4th of August and the Gulf of Tonkin incident are not as definitive. No wreckage was ever recovered, and neither were any bodies5. Shortly after his first report, in the wee hours of the morning, Captain of the USS Maddox John J. Herrick sent a cable-message where he expressed doubt that the attack actually happened. No craft were actually seen by the Maddox apart from a hazy report from Herrick that he had seen two objects on the horizon. Herrick sends out two more cables later on. He continues to express his doubt that there was, in fact, an attack and that weather may have caused the radar and sonar to act strangely or show what was confused with an attack. He is quoted as saying that a “complete evaluation” is necessary before “any further action” is taken. McNamara testified later on that he had read Herrick's later cables, but that he didn't call the President to alert him of them and that his earlier recommendation for a full attack may now be unfounded6. It is this mistake that leads many to believe that McNamara was a primary reason for the full-on attacks on North Vietnam, and that if Johnson had been aware of Herrick's later cables, he would not have allowed the attacks to happen.
Look before you leap; don't count your chickens before they hatch. Idioms that advise us to think things through, and to be patient, lest we make a decision that we will regret. Is this what happened after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident? Did President Lyndon B. Johnson make the decision to attack North Vietnam before he knew all the information, or did something a bit more avoidable happen? What if McNamara had told the President about the earlier cables sent by the Captain of the USS Maddox? It's very well possible that the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War would be very different, perhaps more positive. After all, Johnson had refused to attack North Korea multiple times prior to his decision in August 1964. Some argue that since McNamara had been pushing for an attack on North Vietnam earlier, he purposely left out this crucial information in order to okay an attack7. Others tend to believe that it was an honest mistake, and that at the time McNamara truly thought that it was unnecessary information, or that he forgot, or that even with these cables it is possible that an attack still did take place8 and Herrick was mistaken about his belief that, well, he was mistaken.
It is not my belief that Robert McNamara purposely avoided telling the President in order to create conflict in North Vietnam. It is not my belief that any politician purposely takes his job wishing to make bad decisions and lead his country in the wrong direction. For whatever reason, McNamara did not tell President Lyndon B. Johnson about Captain Herrick's later cables. In this day and age, politicians receive more scrutiny than ever. Sometimes they make decisions that will receive great love and support, while other times they will receive anger and criticism for their choices. There are good and bad choices concerning the Vietnam War, just as there are good and bad choices in every war since then and every politician who made a world-altering decision. Everyone makes mistakes and can make bad choices— it's just that when they concern the fate of your country and it's people, these mistakes can cost more.
Notes
2. CTG [Command Task Group] 77.5 message "Torpedo Attack on DD(S)," 021506Z:." August 12, 2004. http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/vietnam/tonkin-5.htm#ctg77.5mess
3. Personal Statements of 4 August Action,"dated 7 Aug.:." August 12, 2004. http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/vietnam/tonkin-1.htm#personalstate
4. Gulf of Tonkin: McNamara admits It didn't happen. ." March 4, 2008. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HODxnUrFX6k
5. Prados, John. "Essay: 40th Anniversary of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident." August 4, 2004. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/essay.htm
6. Porter, Gareth. "Robert McNamara deceived LBJ on Gulf of Tonkin, documents show ." July 8, 2009. http://www.prisonplanet.com/robert-mcnamara-deceived-lbj-on-gulf-of-tonkin-documents-show.html
7. "Tonkin Gulf Intelligence "Skewed" According to Official History and Intercepts." December 1, 2005. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/press20051201.htm
8. Hanyok, Robert J. "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964." Cryptologic Quarterly 19, no. 4 (2005): [2-5].
